



The inauguration of the DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
represents an exciting step in the institutionalization of a subject area in
academic law formerly found only at the fringe of legal scholarship and law
school curriculums. Often shunned as a political activity inappropriate to
institutions committed to academic rigor, objectivity, and neutrality, gender
law has begun to lay down roots as a disciplined set of inquiries that
enhance the rigor of conventional legal study and offer tools for improving
the objectivity and neutrality of law, even as it challenges the conventional
meanings of those concepts.
There are two principal ways scholars have organized the field of
gender law. The first is to draw together legal doctrines and analyses from
conventional legal fields that seem to have special relevance to women such
as employment law, family law, criminal law, and constitutional law. This
approach is typical in law school "sex-based discrimination" and "women
and the law" courses. The second is to identify theoretical perspectives that
cross-cut conventional legal boundaries and model alternative relationships
between gender and law. This more theoretical approach is common in
feminist jurisprudence or feminist legal theory courses. I find a combination
of these two approaches desirable but, as my own textbook in this field
demonstrates,' I believe that the alternative theoretical perspectives are what
makes gender a subject in its own right, as opposed to a set of derivations
from other, more well-established areas of study. The purpose of this Essay
is to make gender law more accessible and more understandable as an
academic field of its own by providing an overview of these perspectives.
The categories I use-formal equality, substantive equality, nonsubordination
theory, different voice theory, and postmodern feminism-are not mutually
exclusive. They have permeable boundaries and encompass multiple themes
and modes of analysis. Moreover, they do not, in themselves, capture all of
the rich diversity and creativity of this maturing area of legal study. My
hope, however, is that they will provide a simplified structure for
understanding the common questions posed in this field and for appreciating
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1. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCrRINE AND COMMENTARY
(1993). I have derived much of this Essay directly from sections of this book, with permission
of the publisher, Little Brown. All rights reserved.
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some of the complexity that has stimulated the initiation of this new
academic publication.
I. FORMAL EQUALITY
Formal equality is the familiar principle that individuals who are alike
should be treated alike, according to their actual characteristics, rather than
stereotypical assumptions. The principle of formal equality can be applied
either to single individuals, whose right to be treated on their own merits
can be viewed as a right of individual autonomy, or to groups, whose
members seek the same treatment as members of other, similarly situated
groups. What makes an issue one of formal equality is that the claim is
limited to treatment in relation to another, similarly situated individual or
group and does not extend to demands for some particular substantive
treatment.
Feminist litigators and academics advocated legal reform in the 1970s
using primarily a formal equality model that emphasized the similarities
between men and women and the desirability of same-treatment solutions to
legal problems.2 They joined with their commitment to equal treatment a
belief in the importance of autonomy and the desirability that both women
and men be free to make their own choices, unconstrained by artificial
barriers and prohibitions. The success of this approach is evidenced by the
fact that most Supreme Court cases striking down sex-based classifications
and practices have been grounded within a formal equality framework,3 as
2. A well-known example is Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, who, as a litigator, challenged sex-based classifications that discriminated against men
as well as those that discriminated against women. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (arguing that widowers should have same property tax exemption as widows);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (arguing that widowers' Social Security benefits
should be same as widows'); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (on brief for amicus curiae
ACLU, arguing that drinking age for males should be same as that for females); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (on brief for amicus curiae, arguing that husbands should be
entitled to dependency benefits under military benefits package on same basis as wives).
Justice Ginsburg's defense of formal equality as the appropriate approach for ending sex-based
discrimination is apparent in her published works as well. See, e.g., Sex and Unequal Protection:
Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. FAM. L. 347 (1971); Gender and Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1 (1975); The Equal Rights Amendment Is The Way, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1978); Sex
Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978); Sexual Equality Under The Fourteenth
and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161 (1979); Ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEx. L. REV. 919 (1979).
3. The first of these cases was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating statutory
preference for men in appointment of estate administrators). Of the cases that followed, many
struck down practices which disadvantaged men rather than women. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating requirement that husbands, but not wives, prove
spousal dependency in order to qualify for dependency benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (invalidating statute that allowed only women to receive alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating statute that established lower drinking age for females). Among
the other most important cases striking down sex-based classifications within a formal equality
framework are Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidating statute that imposed child
support duties on parents for their sons longer than for their daughters); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (invalidating statute that gave husbands control and management
powers over marital property).
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have most federal anti-discrimination statutes. Most scholars continue to
adhere, in varying degrees, to empirical methods characteristic of a formal
equality approach, whereby the factual assumptions of sex-based constraints
are examined, stereotypes exposed, and barriers to free choice removed.'
Formal equality has met the most resistance when confronted with rules
and practices that distinguish between men and women on the basis of sex-
unique characteristics, especially pregnancy and childbearing. As explained
below,6 some critics of formal equality urge special measures to overcome
the disadvantages of these characteristics, such as mandatory job security for
women who leave work to have babies.7 Formal equality advocates oppose
such "special" measures when comparable benefits are not provided to
workers who leave work for other disabilities. While acknowledging that
pregnancy and childbearing are biologically unique, these advocates contend
that the differences are less significant and less relevant to employee benefit
policies than the similarities.' They point out that the arguments used to
justify special accommodations for pregnant women are the same as those
used to impose undesirable "protections" or limitations on women, such as
maximum hour restrictions not imposed on men,9 mandatory maternity
leave," and the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance plans."
Given the dangers of special treatment, formal equality advocates prefer to
view pregnancy as similar to other disabilities that men also experience, and
thus entitled to treatment no worse, and no better, than those conditions.
12
4. See The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1978) (equal pay for equal work);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1981 & Supp. 1992) (equal
employment opportunity); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000a (1981)
(equal access to public accommodations); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §1681 (1990) (equal educational opportunity).
5. As gender law has evolved, the empirical methods developed under the formal
equality approach have been extended to reveal increasingly subtle patterns of sex
discrimination. Such methods have been used, for example, to reveal how apparently neutral
appearance and personality standards in the workplace interact with stereotypes about women
to disadvantage women's employment opportunities. See Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing
Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73 (1982); Mary F. Radford, Sex
Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990);
Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske, The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT.
L. REV. 89 (1990).
6. See infra note 16.
7. See, e.g., California Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)
(upholding mandatory job security from challenge under Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
8. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 193, 200 (1982).
9. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) ("[woman's] physical structure and a
proper discharge of her maternal functions ... justify legislation to protect her from the
greed as well as the passion of man").
10. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (overturning unpaid,
mandatory maternity leave policy based on presumption that school teachers become
physically incapable of being classroom teachers after the fourth month of pregnancy).
11. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding exclusion of pregnancy from
comprehensive state disability insurance plan).
12. The most articulate present-day advocate for formal equality is Wendy Webster
Williams, who argues across a variety of contexts that women gain more than they lose by
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II. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
While a formal equality approach judges the form of a rule, requiring
that it treat women and men on the same terms without special barriers or
benefits due to their sex, a substantive equality approach looks to a rule's
results or effects. It points out that equal treatment leads to outcomes that
are unequal because of differences between men and women. Advocates of
substantive equality demand that rules take account of these differences in
order to eliminate the disadvantages they bring to women.
Just what differences should 'be recognized and how they should be
taken into account is not, of course, self-evident. The different possibilities
have resulted in several models of substantive equality, each of which
reflects somewhat different substantive ideals.
One version of substantive equality attempts to remedy the effects of
past discrimination. For example, women historically have been excluded
either by law or by gender role expeciations from having certain jobs or
earning wages comparable to those earned by men."3 Affirmative action and
comparable worth schemes are examples of remedial measures designed to
reverse the effects of past discrimination. These remedies achieve their goals,
respectively, by boosting women into occupational fields dominated
historically by men 4 and by restructuring wage scales to eliminate the
effects of past patterns of gender-based job segregation."5
Another type of substantive equality focuses on biological differences
between women and men. To counteract the disadvantages women
experience as a result of their unique capacity to bear children and to breast-
feed, many feminist theorists advocate special accommodations to women to
eliminate these disadvantages, such as job security for women who leave the
workplace to bear children. 6 Legislation mandating this accommodation
pursuing strategies that emphasize and reinforce their differences from men. See, e.g.,
Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 8, at 196-200; Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981); Notes
From a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99. Other scholars favoring formal equality
approaches include: WENDY KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM, WOMEN'S FLIGHT FROM EQUALITY
(1990); CYNTHIA EPSTEIN, DECEPTIvE DISTINCnONS: SEX, GENDER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1988);
DAVID KiRP, MARK YUDOF & MARLENE FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE (1986); Nadine Taub, From
Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381 (1985); see also
Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191.
13. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
AMERICAN WOMEN (1990).
14. See, e.g., Sylvia Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers"-Affirmative Action for Women in
Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for
Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 934 (1986); Deborah
Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207 (1988). See also Heidi I. Hartmann &
Stephanie Aaronson, Pay Equity and Women's Wage Increases: Success in the States, A Model for
the Nation, 1 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & P. 65 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
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was upheld by the United States Supreme Court even though it was not
available for workers who leave work for other reasons. 7
Others have urged more radical substantive equality approaches that
look beyond biological differences to social norms and practices that
disadvantage women. Various social pressures, for example, steer women
into lower-paying occupational categories,18 encourage their economic
dependence on men, 9 and lead them to be the primary caretakers of
children.' Christine Littleton proposes an "acceptance" model of substantive
equality that attempts to equalize the costs of engaging in female activities,
whether biologically or socially defined.'
Substantive equality theory focuses on outcomes, but does not
necessarily require identical or mirror-image outcomes. Some substantive
equality advocates favor equal treatment in some situations and special
accommodation in others, insisting, for example, on equal access for women
to men's athletic teams, private clubs, and colleges, but on separate teams,
clubs, and colleges for women to meet their special needs.' In family law,
substantive equality theorists have urged the elimination of rules favoring
men while arguing for the adoption of child custody standards that take
special account of women's disproportionate investment in childrearing,'
and standards for property division and alimony at divorce that are more
likely to eliminate society-wide disadvantages faced by women than current
standards do.' In each instance, the argument is not that women should be
entitled to whatever is most favorable to them but that, depending on the
WOMEN'S L.I. 1 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955 (1984); Linda Krieger & Patricia Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983).
17. See California Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)
(withstanding challenge under Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
18. According to Department of Commerce figures, 50.7 percent of all women work in
only nineteen of the 503 occupational categories. All except three of these nineteen
occupations are at least sixty percent female, and all but four of the nineteen occupations pay
in the bottom half of 421 ranked earnings. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Women in the
American Economy, Current Population Reports (Nov. 1986): 18, 23, cited in Mary Ann Mason,
Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women Workers, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 393, 397 n.18 (1992).
19. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988).
20. See Elizabeth Maret & Barbara Finlay, The Distribution of Household Labor Among
Women in Dual-Earner Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 357, 360 (1984).
21. See Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).
Thus, for example, she argues that society should recognize as equal, in economic terms, the
job of mother and "warrior." Id. at 1329-30.
22. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1986)
(arguing the law should not allow all-men's colleges, but should allow all-women's colleges
until discrimination no longer puts women at a disadvantage).
23. See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1 (1990-1991);
Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 133 (1992).
24. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY
(1989).
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circumstances, equality sometimes requires equal treatment and sometimes
requires special measures to counteract men's advantages over women.
III. NONSUBORDINATION THEORY
The nonsubordination perspective shifts the focus of attention from
gender-based differences to the imbalance of power between women and
men. This perspective, also known as dominance theory, makes the relevant
inquiry not whether women are like or unlike men, but whether a rule or
practice furthers the subordination of women. Correspondingly, similarities
and differences between women and men are important under this theory
not as the inevitable givens to which the law must respond, but as social
constructs designed to make one set of social arrangements seem more
natural or legitimate than another.
Nonsubordination theory bears a complex relationship to equality
theory. Catharine MacKinnon, nonsubordination theory's most well-known
proponent, has strongly criticized both formal and substantive equality
approaches on the grounds that each approach maintains men as the
reference point-the basic norm-to which women are compared. As a
result, women's equality interest is limited to that which men have already
defined for their own needs and does not extend to matters that might more
nearly correspond to women's needs.' At the same time, MacKinnon's
principal work in the areas of sexual harassment and pornography
demonstrates how purportedly neutral practices and legal concepts operate
as forms of sexual discrimination which disadvantage, or "subordinate,"
women in relation to men. Thus, even as she presents nonsubordination
theory as an alternative to equality theory, MacKinnon retains a comparative
framework of analysis.
A major contribution of nonsubordination theory to feminist method is
its emphasis on women's accounts of their own experiences, both as a
challenge to conventional understandings of objectivity and as a source of
empirical truth.' According to MacKinnon, conventional understandings of
objectivity disguise as point-of-view-lessness what is actually a male point of
view. The turn to women's experiences to expose this disguise and to help
women ascertain their own objective truths is the feminist method of
"consciousness-raising."'
25. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 34-
36 (1987).
26. For further discussion regarding the use of narratives in feminist jurisprudence see
infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
27. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636-39 (1983). This methodology is highlighted in Christine A.
Littleton's review of MacKinnon's FEMINISM UNMODIFIED. See Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence:
The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 757 (1989).
28. MacKinnon's own account of consciousness-raising as feminist method is developed
most fully in Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982). Other discussions of the topic are found in: Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 863-67 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Liberal
Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of
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The outlines of MacKinnon's dominance theory were first established in
her work on sexual harassment, in which she argued that sexually predatory
conduct long accepted as the normal give and take between men and
women in the workplace constitutes a form of discrimination based on sex.
According to her analysis, such conduct systematically demeans women as
sexual objects, thereby reinforcing male control and power over women.' In
1986, the United States Supreme Court recognized MacKinnon's basic theory
that sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination,' although it
limited the definition of sexual harassment to conduct which is "unwelcome"
and "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."'' A number of
feminist writers subsequently employed MacKinnon's basic insights about the
invisible presence of the male perspective to show how determinations of
whether particular conduct is unwelcome, or sufficiently severe or pervasive,
often reincorporate prevailing gender role expectations that are based on
male dominance and female submission. 2
The most controversial application of MacKinnon's dominance theory is
the conclusion that pornography constitutes discrimination on the basis of
sex.' According to MacKinnon, pornography defines women in terms of
their sexual use (and abuse) and constructs sexuality in terms of women's
objectification for men's sexual pleasure. In eroticizing sexual violence
Justice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613, 618-24 (1986); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 602-04 (1986); Ann
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1401-02 (1986).
Feminist legal theorists have described other methods, such as "asking the woman
question" and feminist practical reasoning. See Bartlett, supra, at 837-39; Heather Wishik, To
Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64 (1986).
To an important extent, these methods can be seen as abstracted adaptations of feminist
consciousness-raising to legal reasoning. They also can be seen as manifestations of a different
"women's way" of thinking. See infra Part IV.
29. See generally, CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979).
30. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 67 (1986).
31. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)). See also Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (affirming the Meritor standard, requiring an
"objectively" hostile or abusive environment, but holding that harassment may be actionable
even when it does not seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or lead her to
suffer injury).
32. Thus, for example, women who wear short skirts and make-up are assumed to
welcome repeated sexual propositions at work, and those who participate in the sexual banter
of the work place, or who initially shrug off harassing behavior as "not that big of a deal"
are held to have conceded that that behavior is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute harassment. Some of the feminist commentators who have addressed these kinds of
issues are: Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991); Martha Chamallas,
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment
Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & THE LAW 95 (1992); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 113 (1989); Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177 (1990).
33. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV.
793, 801 (1991).
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against women, along with the submission, pain, and humiliation it
produces, pornography systematically sanctions aggressive and hurtful
behavior against women. Courts have held that the First Amendment
protects pornography as "free speech" and that the remedy for harmful
speech is counterspeech' MacKinnon responds that this remedy is illusory
because pornography silences women, defining them as sexual objects who
could have nothing to say that is worth listening to. Indeed, she argues that
the pretense that women are free to define themselves only strengthens the
appearance of neutrality and thus, ultimately, male dominance.'
Some feminist scholars, while not rejecting nonsubordination theory,
have resisted firmly MacKinnon's position on pornography, particularly her
disregard of the positive value of the First Amendment for women.' Others
have extended MacKinnon's critique of pornography and the First
Amendment to other forms of "speech" that single out women or members
of racial or other minorities as objects of subordination, denigration, and
stigmatization.37
34. See, e.g., American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (1985), affd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
35. MacKinnon's writings about pornography are legion. Many of her essays are collected
in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 127-213
(1987). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194-214
(1989); MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 33. The other
principal figure in the campaign for legal regulation of pornography is Andrea Dworkin. See
Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1985); Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 55 (1987).
36. Some critics of MacKinnon's analysis of pornography argue that the legal prohibition
of pornography reinforces sexist stereotypes about men as "irresponsible beasts, with 'natural
physiological responses' which can be triggered by sexually explicit images of women, and for
which the men cannot be held accountable," and sexist stereotypes about women including
that they are incapable of consent and that "'good' women do not seek and enjoy sex." Nan
D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., in
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 127, 129 (Fall 1987-
Winter 1988); see also Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in Its
Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 359 (1987) (arguing society needs more, not less, sexually
explicit expression, in order to address the problems of child and adult sexual abuse, AIDS
and other sexually-transmitted diseases, and to improve all forms of consensual, intimate
relationships). Others have argued that MacKinnon's theory of pornography, by assuming that
first, men are free subjects who use pornography to construct and impose their views of
sexuality on women; and second, women are involuntary actors who lack subjectivity, is a
"constant reaffirmation" of male power and "an unending rewriting of the myth of male
subjectivity," which makes an affirmative feminist program "problematic, to say the least."
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Tame Feminist Radical
Theory, 5 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 123, 179-80 (1992).
Supporters of MacKinnon's regulatory approach to pornography argue that it is
consistent with, rather than opposed to, the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (arguing pornography is "low value"
speech not entitled to First Amendment protection).
37. The best scholarship along these lines focuses on the problematic effects of "hate
speech" on members of racial minorities, although the examples given often include white as
well as minority women. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Discriminatory Harassment
and Free Speech, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; see also Mary Ellen Gale,
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A related application of nonsubordination theory concerns rape and
domestic violence. Just as the First Amendment protects pornographic
constructions of women as sexual objects for men's pleasure, the law of rape
and domestic violence is said to reflect the male perspective and thus affirm
men's physical abuse of women. For example, some scholars have argued
that various evidentiary rules applicable in proving rape reflect notions of
consent, resistance, and self-defense that are more characteristic of men's
responses to danger than women's.' Others have stressed how women's
accounts of their experiences of rape are often undermined by the stylized
descriptions of the sexual encounter presented by the defense.' In addition,
women's actions are all too easily interpreted as motivated by fantasy or
revenge, negating women's claims of coercion and perpetuating assumptions
that women invite abuse.' Along similar lines, some scholars explain how
battered women are seen as helpless victims, and thus are disadvantaged in
child custody disputes." Still others use concepts from nonsubordination
theory to show how procedural reforms in divorce law work against women
who have been the victims of domestic violence.42
Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 119
(1991).
38. See SUSAN ESTRICH, RAPE 1114, 1140-41 (1986). Many scholars argue that legal
standards of self-defense should be flexible enough to comprehend why abused women who
strike back at their abusers may stay with their batterers well beyond the point of
conventional "reason," and why they may finally act to protect themselves at a time when
they do not appear to be immediately threatened. See, e.g., Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered
Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1992);
CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW
(1989); Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1991).
39. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992); Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 379 (1991).
40. See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of the
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991); Lynne N. Henderson,
Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193 (1988); see also
Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male
Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23.
41. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Martha Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 4 (1991); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992). These scholars have been careful to craft
strategies that affirm women's agency and counteract negative assessments of women that
might undermine their claims for such legal rights as child custody. See also Joyce McConnell,
Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (arguing that treating violence against women as actionable
involuntary servitude may help women from being cast entirely in roles of victims by shifting
the focus away from women's victimization and toward the unreasonableness of the batterer's
conduct).
42. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441
(1992); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
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By examining women's victimization through the nonsubordination
theory lens, these writers have helped to frame abused women's situations
not simply as individual problems, but as part of the overall institutional
oppression of women. The central conceptual device for facilitating this
institutionalized pattern is the dichotomy between the public and the private,
which operates in the law to protect strangers, usually men, from one
another while shielding "private" violence that harms mainly female
victims.'
Nonsubordination theory has also been useful in putting issues of
discrimination against homosexuals within the broader context of
discrimination on the basis of sex. According to Sylvia A. Law, for example,
laws that discriminate against homosexuals are a form of sex-based
discrimination because they are an integral part of the same fixed
heterosexual norms about gender roles that subordinate women to men." A
number of other scholars have applied a similar line of analysis to argue
that laws and other restrictions that deny individuals in homosexual
relationships the opportunity to marry, be parents, or enjoy other benefits
available to conventional family units are a crucial part of the maintenance
of a male-dominated, heterosexual culture."
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
43. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991). For a historical
treatment of family violence which focuses on its political construction see LINDA GORDON,
HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).
Robin West has gone the furthest in arguing that the state has a constitutional duty to
eradicate private as well as public violence. See West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990).
Work outside of the domestic violence context that has been important in analyzing and
criticizing the public/private dichotomy and its impact on women includes Frances Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN
SOCIAL LIFE 281 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
In response to some of these critiques, Ruth Gavison has cautioned that while the
public/private dividing line has often been used to subordinate women, privacy is still an
important value for women and that the question should not be how to eliminate the
public/private dichotomy but how to redraw the lines so that the dichotomy does not
continue to harm women. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
44. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187.
45. Examples of feminist legal scholarship focusing on the impact of the law on lesbians
include: Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1980); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent? The Need to Develop a
Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Ruthann Robson & S.E.
Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEM. L. REV. 511
(1990); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
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IV. DIFFERENT VOICE THEORY
Equality and nonsubordination theories of gender view women's
differences either as factually insignificant, as problems to be solved through
remedial accommodations, or as excuses used by a corrupt system to
subordinate women. In contrast, different voice theory, also referred to as
connection theory, views women's differences as potentially valuable
resources that might serve as a better model of social organization and law
than existing "male" characteristics and values. Within different voice theory,
women are said to have a greater sense of interconnectedness than men and
to value relationships more than individual rights. Women are said to favor
an "ethic of care" over "justice" or "rights" models of morality. They are
also said to use less abstract, more contextual forms of reasoning than men
which focus on the unique context of a dilemma and the on-going
relationships and interdependencies of the parties.' Different voice theorists
argue that as to each of these distinctions, women's values have the
potential to improve existing law.
Scholarship that uses women's different voice theory to promote legal
reform has extended to so many conventional fields of law that it is possible
to speak of the "mainstreaming" of this theory. 7 Leslie Bender uses
different voice theory to justify proposals in tort law such as a duty to
rescue, 8 the obligation of corporate officers with mass tort liability to
provide personal caretaking remedies to their victims,9 and the legal option
of physician-assisted suicide.' Other scholars use different voice theory to
urge workplace policies that allow workers to better integrate responsibilities
to their families and employers,5' union policies that better acknowledge the
values of connection and community, 2 and corporate strategies that better
reflect "the ethics of care, responsibility, connection and sharing."53
46. Many of these comparisons are based on the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan,
whose work, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982), has strongly influenced many feminist legal theorists. The most radical claims
regarding differences between men's and women's values affecting law and legal theory are
set forth in Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) and Leslie
Bender, From Gender Differences to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care
in the Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (Summer 1990). For a milder version, see Kenneth Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
47. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493
(1992).
48. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuC. 3
(1988).
49. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crises, Mass Torts, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848.
50. Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986).
52. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1991); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist
Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REV. 481 (1992).
53. See Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal
Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543 (1985).
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Proposals to reform the tax system,' bankruptcy law," international
human rights law,' and contracts law 7 also incorporate the notions of
responsibility and care upon which different voice theory depends.
In addition to proposals for changes in substantive law, feminist
theorists have called for process and method reforms that cut deeply into
conventional notions of legal practice. Carrie Menkel-Meadow proposes
techniques and ethical standards for negotiation that challenge the
adversarial models of adjudication that form the backbone of the American
legal system.' Other theorists advocate more contextualized methods of
legal reasoning and decision making, not only because these methods better
correspond to women's "different voice," 9 but also because they illuminate
the "maleness" of abstract legal principles, encourage a greater respect for
difference, and foster a more critical awareness of the importance of the
reasoner's own particular perspective.' Some have also called for methods
of judging that emphasize not only greater contextualization, but also
collaborative decision making and empathy."
The biggest challenge for different voice theory is the danger that it
may reinforce the subordination historically associated with the assertion of
women's differences. Although some have concluded that this historical
association undermines the capacity of different voice theory to provide a
positive model for feminist legal reform,62 the most recent applications of
54. See Marjorie Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).
55. See Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors,
68 MICH. L. REV. 1506 (1990) (book review).
56. See, e.g., Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet,
13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts,
Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REV. 791 (1991).
58. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1983).
59. See Suzannah Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
60. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10
CARDozo L. REV. 37 (1988). Scholars who support the move toward more contextualized
methods of legal reasoning for these reasons do not tend to associate themselves with
different voice theory, but rather with more pragmatic philosophical traditions. See, e.g.,
Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990); Catharine
Pierce Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990); Linda R. Hirshman, The
Book of "A," 79 TEx. L. REV. 971 (1992).
61. See Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations For Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988); Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on
Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1845 (1988); Sherry, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); see also
Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon & Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985)
(panel debate on, among other things, the viability of different voice theory or an ethic of
care in feminist theory and practice). MacKinnon's position is probably most succinctly stated
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIScOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39 (1987) ("Women value care
because men have valued us according to the care we give them . . . Women think in
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different voice theory attempt to integrate a concern for relationships and
responsibility within a framework that also values women's autonomy and
independence.' This renewed attention to women's autonomy has been
shaped, in part, by responses to a set of challenges, explored below, known
as postmodern feminism.
V. POSTMODERN FEMINISM
The perspectives described thus far share common assumptions about
the rationality of law, the possibility of objective truth on which the law can
be based, and the coherence and stability of the individual subject on whom
the law acts. Postmodern feminism represents a set of critiques of these
assumptions. Postmodern feminism made its entry into the law by way of
the critical legal studies movement (CLS), a loose coalition of left-leaning
academic scholars who, beginning in the 1970s, argued that law is
indeterminate, non-objective, hierarchical, self-legitimating, overly-
individualistic, and morally impoverished.' While the CLS movement has
faced heavy fire for its failure to develop a positive program that could
survive its own critique, feminist scholars have absorbed the insights of this
movement and attempted to transform them into the basis of a constructive
feminist practice.' Starting from the proposition that no social arrangements
or legal rules are inevitable or natural, they have defined this practice in
terms of support for those arrangements and rules which, under existing,
non-ideal social conditions, seem most just."
relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men.").
63. Among the best examples are: Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992); Pamela S. Karlan &
Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal
Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 858 (1993); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries,
and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990); Susan Kupfer, Autonomy and Community
in Feminist Legal Thought, 22 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 583 (1992).
64. Some feminists were key figures in the CLS movement. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Frances Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984);
FRANcEs OLSEN, THE SEX OF LAW, IN THE POLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453
(David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, supra note 43.
65. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory,
Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education, or "The Fem-Crits Go To Law School," 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 61 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
66. See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296; Minow, Justice
Engendered, supra note 60.
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A. AUTONOMY
An important target of the postmodern challenge is the law's
assumption that individuals are capable of having "intent," of exercising
"choice" or "consent," and of acting and thinking like "reasonable" people.
The postmodern view of the individual or the "legal subject" opposes the
Enlightenment view of the stable, coherent, and rational self with a more
complicated view of the individual as "constituted" from multiple
institutional and ideological forces that, in various ways, overlap, intersect,
and even contradict each other. Although these forces join to produce a
reality that the individual subject experiences as real or true, it is in fact a
reality or truth that is "constructed". Under the postmodern view, the
individual's experience of reality is more a function of fluctuating,
constructed possibilities than a representation of what is real, rational, or in
some transcendent sense, true.67
Feminist theorists have joined the postmodern view of the "constituted"
individual with analyses of how the legal standards of consent, intent, and
reasonableness have been constructed in gendered ways. Thus, for example,
questions regarding whether women in particular circumstances consented to
sexual intercourse,' agreed to give up their child at birth,69 wanted to use
birth control,7 intended to form a contract,7  or chose to abuse drugs while
pregnant' have all been analyzed from the perspective of the institutional
and ideological forces that constrain and construct those choices. While
recognizing and defining the often invisible constraints which make
autonomy a legal fiction, however, these feminist theorists recognize that
meaningful distinctions nevertheless can be made between "more" and "less"
autonomy and that more autonomy remains a positive goal for women."
67. Helpful discussions of the postmodern view of reality can be found in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). One of the essays in that work,
Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory by Jane Flax, is especially helpful. See
also Judith Butler, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1989).
Specifically in the legal context, see Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory
of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 69 (1989).
68. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095 (1987);
Lynne Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193
(1987); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C.D. L. REV. 1013 (1991).
69. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Nancy
Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion
Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369 (1992).
70. See Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or Crime
Control, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1992); Joelle S. Weiss, Controlling HIV-Positive Women's Procreative
Destiny: A Critical Equal Protection Analysis, 2 CONST. L.J. 643 (1992). See also NICOLE J. GRANT,
THE SELLING OF CONTRACErMON: THE DALKON SHIELD CASE, SEXUALITY, AND WOMEN'S
AUTONOMY (1992).
71. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985).
72. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Dawn Johnsen, Shared
Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569
(1992).
73. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
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Some theorists who bring postmodern insights about the individual
subject to bear on the law have focused on how the law constricts and
defines the female body. Building on the work of French feminists such as
Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and H6lne Cixous, for example, Marie Ashe
demonstrates how a woman's physical body is constructed by the
management and control of her reproductive functions. 4 Other feminist
theorists, such as Mary Joe Frug and Drucilla Cornell, have stressed concrete
physical and sensual aspects of women's bodies as sources of imaginative
experiences that might emancipate women from the reality-and
seductions-of gender oppression.'
B. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM
The critical edge of postmodern feminism has been directed not only
outward, against conventional legal doctrine, but also inward, against
feminist theory itself. Much of this internal criticism has been articulated as
a charge of "essentialism."
There are at least three phenomena to which the charge of essentialism
refers. One is a critique of false generalizations or universalisms. Much of
feminist jurisprudence, as discussed above, has been directed toward
exposing the extent to which the law's supposedly objective norms reflect
male interests and male points of view. The charge of feminist essentialism
is that in speaking about women and women's interests, feminists, too, often
presuppose a particular privileged norm-that of the white, middle class,
heterosexual woman-and thereby deny or ignore differences based on race,
class, sexual identity, and other characteristics that inform a woman's
identity. Essentialism, in this context, refers to the exclusion that results from
such unstated norms. 6 A related claim, made by feminist critical race
theorists, is that race and sex often are bifurcated in legal claims of
L. REV. 1559 (1991); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of
Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thought on "Reproduction"
and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1988); Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse
Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 521 (1988); Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity:
Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987). Works on
French feminism include: REVALUING FRENCH FEMINISM: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DIFFERENCE,
AGENCY, AND CULTURE (Nancy Fraser & Sandra Lee Bartky eds., 1992); FRENCH FEMINIST
THOUGHT (Toril Moi ed., 1987); NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de
Courtivron eds., 1981).
75. See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND
ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1991). For a more
conventional analysis of how the female body challenges existing legal norms, see ZILLAH
EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988).
76. Much of this analysis has been based on the work of feminist philosopher Elizabeth
Spelman. Her basic claims are stated in ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). See also Martha Minow, Feminist Reason:
Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1988); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Grounding the Theories, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989).
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discrimination brought by black women, thus ignoring exclusions, often
unrecognized as discrimination, based on the intersection of race and
gender." These criticisms have led feminist scholars to be increasingly
careful of their own unstated assumptions, despite the difficulties of doing
SO.
78
A second form of essentialism is what might be called the "naturalist"
error. Again, this form of essentialism is the mirror image of a critique
feminists have made against conventional legal theory-namely, the charge
that legal principles are falsely assumed to be inherent, transcendent,
universal, or natural, instead of socially constructed. As applied to feminist
jurisprudence itself, this critique warns that treating "woman" as a self-
explanatory, natural category and assuming that once certain "man-made" or
false forms of oppression are removed women will find their "true"
identities accepts the mistaken view of truth as absolute, findable, and final.
The critique has special force against the charge that women who do not
accept a particular feminist program or agenda are the victims of "false
consciousness." 79 In response to this charge, feminists increasingly are
moving away from the notion that the central feminist project consists in
finding woman's "true" consciousness, toward a view of women's liberation
that recognizes both social constraints and the creative possibilities women
have to participate in their own construction.'
The third essentialist critique of feminist jurisprudence is one of gender
imperialism. This critique is that feminists give too much primacy to sex as
a basis of discrimination and too little to other forms of oppression, such as
those based on race, class, and sexual orientation. On this ground, Angela
Harris criticizes Catharine MacKinnon's analysis of a Santa Clara Pueblo
tribal ordinance that denies Pueblo membership to the children of female,
but not male, members of the Pueblo who marry non-members of the tribe,
77. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and
Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21 (1991). More generally, on the transformative effect one
characteristic can have on other protected characteristics, see Madeline Morris, Stereotypic
Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes and Antidiscrimination Law, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251
(1989).
78. See Jennifer Nedelsky, The Challenges of Multiplicity, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1591 (1991)
(book review) (discussing "the specter of infinite fragmentation" that arises when one attempts
to escape the sin of false universalisms).
79. Criticism of the notion of "false consciousness" has been levied most directly against
Catharine MacKinnon. Among the feminist critics who have targeted MacKinnon's insistence
on the existence of a single "unmodified feminism," "women's point of view," or "woman's
voice" are: Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1559 (1987) (reviewing FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW); Drucilla
Cornell, Sexual Differences, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247 (1991) (book review); Kathryn Abrams, Ideology
and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990).
80. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE LAW (1991); MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); PATRICIA
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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arguing that MacKinnon's analysis wrongly assumes that a Pueblo member's
gender-based identity is more important than her tribal identity."s More
recently, the imperialism criticism has been made with respect to the
feminist condemnation of practices in Muslim societies that subjugate women
to men, especially the practice of female genital mutilation. 2 Non-
essentialists argue that by ignoring the cultural and religious significance of
these practices, feminists create a theory that makes the white, Christian,
American woman the standard for all women.
To combat each of these forms of essentialism, many scholars urge
greater use of the narrative method. Individual and group narratives offer
alternatives to the dominant stories or universal narratives on which the law
is based and give voice to the actual, otherwise submerged, experiences of
the dominated.' Insofar as these alternatives help individuals to reveal their
own, unstated assumptions and the experiences of others who do not share
these assumptions, they also facilitate empathetic understanding."
Paradoxically, at the same time that they reveal differences in perspective,
narratives also help to create coherent identities by identifying, stabilizing,
and integrating common bonds among women.'
81. See Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
593-94 (1990).
82. For a review of how different feminist theories approach such practices, see Karen
Engle, Female Subjects and Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26
N. ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992) (arguing that advocates of women's rights must understand and
acknowledge the presence of the "exotic other female" who condones female genital
mutilation in her culture). Among the scholarship that could be characterized as anti-
essentialist, in the sense of criticizing the feminist critiques of such practices as being cultural
arrogance, are Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1982) and
Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering the Differences, 26 N. ENG. L.
REV. 1527 (1992).
83. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (using a narrative to combat dominant
images of welfare mothers and client representations); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (using narratives to
counter prevailing images of "helpless" battered women); Robin West, The Difference in
Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
81 (1987) (using narratives to refute generalizations about what kind of sex women want).
Critical race theorists have especially committed to narrative strategies. See Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionalists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991).
84. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-
Modernism and the Stories of Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287 (1992) (book review); Toni M.
Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2099 (1989); Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
85. See Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993) (book
review). Recent feminist writing has identified the potential dangers of the narrative method.
Among the dangers are that narrative can simply substitute one universal narrative for
another, can exclude others who have not had the same experiences, and can be too
subjective or even untrue. Most who have analyzed these risks have shown how awareness of
them will improve the utility of the narrative method. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the
Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzannah Sherry, Telling
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VI. CONCLUSION
The determination of gender law scholars to move from the safety of
critique to the vulnerable ground of positive reconstruction of law, and to
turn the lens of feminist method inward, upon itself, symbolizes the
contemporary premise of this emerging field of law-ongoing rather than
complete, questioning rather than declarative, and self-critical rather than
complacent. These characteristics make it impossible to predict the future of
gender law, but at the same time make it likely that it will occupy an ever-
increasing presence in legal theory and practice.
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
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